#incentive-compatibility
#incentive-compatibility

The combination of UIC, MIC, and OCA-proof is generally impossible for truthful mechanisms, contrasting with non-truthful mechanisms, where feasibility is achievable.

Miscellaneous

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#incentive-compatibility#incentive-compatibility

How Bidding Rule Metadata Could Reinvent Blockchain Incentives | HackerNoon

Why Your Auction Mechanism Might Be Vulnerable to Collusion | HackerNoon

No Blockchain Auction Can Satisfy UIC, MIC, and Global SCP at Once | HackerNoon

How Bidding Rule Metadata Could Reinvent Blockchain Incentives | HackerNoon

Why Your Auction Mechanism Might Be Vulnerable to Collusion | HackerNoon

No Blockchain Auction Can Satisfy UIC, MIC, and Global SCP at Once | HackerNoon

Why the Perfect Blockchain Fee Mechanism May Be Impossible | HackerNoon

What Is a Transaction Fee Mechanism? Definitions, Incentives, and Strategies | HackerNoon

Why Truthful Blockchain Mechanisms Fail Under Finite Block Sizes | HackerNoon

Why No Transaction Fee Mechanism Can Truly Be Collusion-Proof | HackerNoon

What Is a Transaction Fee Mechanism? Definitions, Incentives, and Strategies | HackerNoon

Why Truthful Blockchain Mechanisms Fail Under Finite Block Sizes | HackerNoon

Why No Transaction Fee Mechanism Can Truly Be Collusion-Proof | HackerNoon

The Impossibility Theorem Behind Truthful Blockchain Bidding Mechanisms | HackerNoon

#incentive-compatibility
#incentive-compatibility