The Impossibility Theorem Behind Truthful Blockchain Bidding Mechanisms | HackerNoon
Briefly

UIC, MIC, and OCA-proof are proven impossible for truthful mechanisms, while non-truthful mechanisms allow the coexistence of these concepts. The distinction between global SCP and OCA-proof lies in their requirements concerning coalition strategies. Global SCP mandates truthfulness from the coalition's optimal strategy, whereas OCA-proof accommodates independent non-truthful strategies. The implications of these findings are explored in the context of mechanism design and transaction fee mechanisms, emphasizing the challenges in achieving incentive-compatible systems under certain constraints.
The combination of UIC, MIC, and OCA-proof is generally impossible for truthful mechanisms, contrasting with non-truthful mechanisms, where feasibility is achievable.
Global SCP requires the optimal strategy of the coalition to be truthful, while OCA-proof allows for independent, non-truthful user strategies.
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