Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFM) struggle to align multiple forms of incentive compatibility, particularly user and miner incentives, with OCA-proofness under finite block constraints. Recent research reveals that existing constructions do not meet all these standards simultaneously, confirming past impossibility results regarding collusion-resilience and incentive compatibility. Furthermore, the ongoing challenge is highlighted through attempts to adopt various compliance frameworks, such as Roughgarden's original OCA-proofness notion, showing that complexities persist in achieving a satisfactory balance among these critical factors.
Both Roughgarden's and Chung and Shi's collusion-resilience notions capture meaningful incentive compatibility considerations, yet existing TFM constructions fail to meet all three criteria simultaneously.
No existing TFM construction simultaneously satisfies user incentive compatibility, miner incentive compatibility, and OCA-proofness under finite block size, indicating significant challenges in achieving these principles.
#transaction-fee-mechanisms #incentive-compatibility #collusion-resilience #finite-block-size #proof-techniques
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