The article discusses strategies for winning in repeated two-player games against behaviorally-biased opponents, who fully understand the payoff matrix. These biases include the Myopic Best Responder and others, which affect decision-making. The framework establishes the significance of 'permissible games,' where payoffs are limited to {1, 0, -1}. The authors analyze how a player can succeed without prior knowledge of the opponent's strategy, thereby providing insights into exploiting behavioral tendencies for strategic advantages in complex game scenarios.
We explore repeated games against behaviorally-biased opponents, focusing on strategies to maximize wins despite limited knowledge of the payoff matrix.
Our analysis begins with the 'Myopic Best Responder' opponent, who optimally reacts to our last action, illustrating foundational behavioral biases.
The concept of permissible games is critical, with payoffs constrained to win, tie, or loss, impacting the strategic landscape of gameplay.
Effective strategies against biased adversaries are essential, especially when they possess complete knowledge of the game's payoff matrix.
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