The EC further pushes to rein-in Google's ad tech monopoly
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The EC further pushes to rein-in Google's ad tech monopoly
"Overall, investigators concluded that Google's vertically integrated ad tech stack created enduring structural conflicts of interest that enabled exclusionary conduct and could not be remedied by competition on the merits alone. See list below for a summary of the EC's findings. Google Ads Google Ads preferentially routed advertiser demand through AdX, even where this was not in advertisers' interests, to strengthen AdX's position in the SSP market."
"DV 360 Google's DSP DV 360 systematically reduced bids submitted to rival supply-side platforms and adjusted bidding behavior to discourage header bidding and divert demand toward AdX. AdX Google's SSP/ad exchange was artificially advantaged through coordinated buy-side and sell-side practices that increased its auction wins, scale and revenues at the expense of competing SSPs."
"DFP Investigators found that Google leveraged the dominance of its publisher-side ad server to favor AdX through auction design and execution choices that rival SSPs could not replicate, therefore negatively impacting publishers. Waterfall auction configuration The Commission found that legacy waterfall mechanics within DFP prioritised AdX demand and reinforced its preferential access to publisher inventory."
The European Commission published provisional findings on Google's ad tech stack, ruling that AdX and DoubleClick for Publishers were dominant for more than a decade and recommending billions in fines and possible divestiture. The review spanned a 363-page report examining the ad exchange, ad network, auction mechanics, demand-side platform, pricing rules, and publisher-side ad server for legal compliance. Investigators concluded that vertical integration created enduring structural conflicts of interest enabling exclusionary conduct not remediable by competition alone. Specific findings include Google Ads routing demand to AdX, DV360 suppressing rival SSP bids and discouraging header bidding, AdX receiving coordinated buy-side and sell-side advantages, and DFP favoring AdX via auction design and waterfall configuration.
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