"Science perfectly captures the structural aspects of reality. If consciousness cannot be explained in such terms, if it's something categorical and non-dispositional, the argument is that it is the best candidate to play that role generally. Disagreement here needs the most spelling out in terms of metaphysics and the philosophy of science. But to put it briefly, I think panpsychists offer a very restrictive description of what science does that few contemporary philosophers of science would not agree with."
"The move from panpsychism to fine-tuning or some sort of anti-Darwinian view is by no means entailed by panpsychism, it's a separate set of beliefs held by some panpsychists you mentioned, so using it to discredit the theory as a whole is unfair. I didn't argue that one implies the other. But there are striking parallels in the reasoning and given the small number of panpsychists, it is curious that they seem to come frequently together."
Panpsychism holds consciousness as a fundamental, ubiquitous property of matter. Panpsychists frame science as structurally complete but metaphysically incomplete, proposing consciousness as a categorical feature science may not capture. Critics say that framing misrepresents contemporary philosophy of science and demands clearer metaphysical argumentation and engagement with current literature. Some individual panpsychists also endorse fine-tuning or anti-Darwinian beliefs, creating notable overlaps in reasoning patterns that invite scrutiny. Defenders emphasize technical rigor and historical influence, while critics stress the need for sustained engagement with scientific and philosophical methodology rather than relying on broad claims about science's limits.
Read at Psychology Today
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