Can Science Account for Consciousness?

"But my discussions here with nonnaturalist skeptics about consciousness science, such as with Philip Goff or Nino Kadic, inevitably get down to metaphysical arguments about intrinsic or categorical properties. Perhaps not surprising given that they are engaged in analytic metaphysics-a subdiscipline of philosophy that I've argued in a series of essays is a counter-Englightenment project not at all conducive to the central philosophical goal of understanding the world."

"(The other argument is the alleged inability for science to fully reduce conscious states to brain processes, which, as I've argued in a recent post, reflects a mistaken radical reductionism among panpsychists that isn't met by any other special science or, for that matter, folk ontology either. But as we'll see, this problem will come up again shortly.) I've tried to make sure that it's accessible to anyone without knowledge of analytic metaphysics."

Many readers lack advanced training in analytic metaphysics, so metaphysical debates are often avoided in favor of meta-philosophy. Exchanges with nonnaturalist skeptics about consciousness focus on intrinsic or categorical properties central to panpsychist claims. Two main arguments for panpsychism are identified: the intrinsic nature argument and the claim that science cannot fully reduce conscious states to brain processes. The intrinsic nature argument holds that physical science captures only structure and relations, not the intrinsic properties that constitute consciousness. Critics link panpsychist metaphysics to counter-Enlightenment tendencies and argue that accessibility to non-specialists is important.

Read at Psychology Today