This case poses a straightforward question: whether the Seventh Amendment entitles a defendant to a jury trial when the SEC seeks civil penalties against him for securities fraud. Our analysis of this question follows the approach set forth in Granfinanciera and Tull v. United States, 481 U. S. 412 (1987). The threshold issue is whether this action implicates the Seventh Amendment. It does. The SEC's antifraud provisions replicate common law fraud, and it is well established that common law claims must be heard by a jury.
The SEC's antifraud provisions might crib from common law fraud, but that does not, in fact, transform them into common law fraud claims. If the SEC decided a finance bro committed common law fraud, they could always go before a jury and make that case. But if the SEC decides someone is a threat to the sanctity of the market and wants to impose sanctions on them as a member of the industry, it is not necessarily a common law fraud claim.
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