The article discusses a ruling by Judge Millett rejecting the argument that machines could be considered authors under copyright law. She highlighted that statutory construction demands more than mere sympathetic definitions, emphasizing that copyright law references human attributes such as life span, family ties, and intentions that machines lack. Millett pointed out that if machines were recognized as authors, it would complicate the understanding of life and death in the context of copyright. She suggested that if the law needs change, it should come from Congress, not the courts.
But Millett pushed back, writing that "statutory construction requires more than just finding a sympathetic dictionary definition."
"Of course, machines do not have 'lives,' nor is the length of their operability generally measured in the same terms as a human life," Millett wrote.
Accepting Thaler's arguments would mean "problematic questions would arise about a machine's 'life' and 'death,'" Millett wrote.
However, according to the judge, "the Creativity Machine does not represent the limits of human technical ingenuity when it comes to artificial intelligence."
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