This thesis investigates fairness in blockchain contexts, specifically focusing on transaction ordering, transparency, and voting power in smart contracts. The research reveals that miners frequently disregard established prioritization norms, favoring transactions that benefit them or their associates rather than adhering strictly to fee-based prioritization. Through experiments, the study highlights troubling instances of miner collusion and dark-fee transactions that undermine the intended fairness and transparency of blockchain systems, suggesting a need for better governance and accountability measures.
Our findings reveal a discrepancy between assumed prioritization norms and actual practices within the blockchain community. In particular, miners often deviate from these norms by prioritizing transactions that serve their own interests or friendly miners.
Through active experiments, we have uncovered instances of miner collusion involving dark-fee transactions. These transactions provide miners with off-chain incentives in a non-transparent manner, contributing to unfair practices in transaction prioritization.
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