"My book, as the title suggests, is about praiseworthiness. There is an enormous literature in philosophy-and in cognate fields, like law and psychology-that is ostensibly about moral agency and moral responsibility in general, but that, in practice, focuses overwhelmingly on blame, blameworthiness, punishment, excuses, exemptions, the standing to blame, and so forth, with only a comparatively tiny amount said about praise, praiseworthiness, and reward."
"As I've argued elsewhere, praise can serve the same communicative social functions that blame serves: we affirm and convey our moral commitments equally well by acknowledging those who meet them as by admonishing those who fall short, and we highlight the respect and consideration that people deserve just as well by commending those who display it as by reprimanding those who lack it."
Praiseworthiness receives far less attention than blame in philosophy and related fields despite addressing core questions about moral agency and responsibility. Philosophical literature concentrates on blameworthiness, punishment, excuses, exemptions, and the standing to blame, leaving praise, praiseworthiness, and reward comparatively neglected. Praise can perform the same communicative and social functions as blame by affirming and conveying moral commitments, acknowledging those who meet moral standards, and highlighting respect and consideration. Recognizing others' gestures of goodwill fosters a less hostile moral environment. Accounts of moral agency are influenced by traditions from Hume to Kant, and the ethics of praise matters for everyday life.
Read at Apaonline
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