In this paper, I analyze the relationship between Hume's moral philosophy and a key aspect of classical Confucianism—namely, the concept of lĭ (禮), which refers both to the virtue of ritual propriety and to rituals themselves. I argue not only that Hume employs conceptual correlates to each of these two aspects of lĭ, but also that he employs them in ways that have a similar, distinctively normative role in the process of moral formation.
I examine Hume's and Mengzi's reliance on aesthetic and moral taste in their sentiment-based theories of virtue. Their views on taste seem to conflict. In his essay "Of the Standard of Taste," Hume observes that people's taste sentiments appear to vary, but he seeks a standard that can reconcile them. In contrast, relying on the uniformity of aesthetic taste, Mengzi argues that humans, by nature, share a universal taste toward morality.
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