Hybrid or Ambiguous, Asymmetric Warfare is Here to Stay

""We were warned in 1999 by the PRC in a white paper, Unrestricted Warfare, written by two Chinese military officers. They told us what they perceived about U.S.' defense stance and where they were likely to press given their perception of our weaknesses and strengths. Our own military processed this warning; it was incorporated into a number of military white papers. The U.S. intelligence community likewise digested the same white paper and military assessments of the same.""

""Ambiguous warfare" is a term that has no proper definition and has been used within U.S. government circles since at least the 1980s. Generally speaking, the term applies in situations in which a state or non-state belligerent actor deploys troops and proxies in a deceptive and confusing manner-with the intent of achieving political and military effects while obscuring the belligerent's direct participation. Russia's actions in Crimea and Ukraine clearly align with this concept, though numerous participants pointed out that it is not a new concept for Russia."

Unrestricted Warfare (1999) by two Chinese military officers described how China might exploit U.S. defense perceptions and press perceived weaknesses. U.S. military and intelligence organizations analyzed and incorporated those assessments into their planning. Despite prior analysis, U.S. defenses were not prepared for large-scale asymmetric cyber intrusions such as the Office of Personnel Management breach. Russian doctrine described by Valery Gerasimov outlines hybrid or ambiguous warfare tactics using deception, proxies, and deniability, as seen in Crimea. CNA characterized ambiguous warfare as deceptive deployment of forces to achieve political and military effects while obscuring direct participation.

Read at Emptywheel