"The classic finding: neurons in the medial temporal lobe-often called "concept cells"-that respond selectively when a person recognizes a specific individual, whether shown in different photos, drawings, or even written names.[1] These cells do exist. But they can't explain meaning. Meaning is compositional: you understand "purple elephant" immediately, though no neuron is pre-tuned to purple-elephantness. Meaning is context-dependent: "bank" means different things in "river bank" versus "savings bank." Neuroimaging reveals that semantic processing engages distributed networks spanning frontal, temporal, and parietal cortices.[2]"
"Neuroscientist Friedemann Pulvermüller has developed a comprehensive neural theory of how meaning arises from brain circuits.[3] His framework identifies four interacting mechanisms: 1. Referential Semantics Words activate sensory and motor patterns associated with their referents. "Apple" activates visual features (red, round), taste (sweet, tart), and the physical sensation of sinking your teeth into it. These are functional links forged through experience."
Meaning originates from distributed, context-sensitive neural activity rather than single, localized concept neurons. Certain medial temporal neurons respond selectively to specific individuals but cannot account for compositionality and context dependence. Semantic processing recruits widespread frontal, temporal, and parietal networks. A neural theory identifies four interacting mechanisms that generate meaning. One mechanism, referential semantics, links words to sensory and motor patterns of referents so that terms like "apple" activate visual, gustatory, and action-related representations. These sensorimotor links form through experience and bind perceptual features, tastes, and motor sensations into functional circuits that contribute to aboutness.
Read at Psychology Today
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