"Interpersonal trust is of enduring interest because it presents a dilemma of choice which can bring great happiness but also deep disappointment. This dilemma can be mitigated, but not eliminated (Krueger et al., in press). If the uncertainty about what the trusted party will do-honor our trust or betray it-were completely removed, trust would not be necessary or even be defined. This is rarely the case, however, and further inquiries into the nature of trust are instructive."
"The experimental trust game is designed to capture the essential dynamics of interpersonal trust. Let us briefly review this game. A trustor, let's call him Atouf, has an endowment of, say, 100 dirham (the currency in Kenitra). Atouf can exit the game by doing nothing. If so, he will keep the endowment. This risk-averse strategy and its outcome are represented by the letter P, the "Penalty" for not trusting."
"If, however, Atouf invests the money by sending it to the trustee, let's call him Basam, its value will increase thanks to the magic by which investments appreciate. Now Basam chooses between keeping all the money, and thus betraying Atouf, and sharing the appreciated investment evenly. In the case of betrayal, Atouf ends up with nothing, an outcome represented by the letter S, for "Sucker.""
Trust involves a choice between potential reward and potential loss that cannot be fully eliminated so long as outcomes remain uncertain. The experimental trust game models this dilemma using a trustor (Atouf) who can keep an endowment (Penalty, P) or send it to a trustee (Basam), after which the trustee can betray (Sucker, S) or reciprocate (Reward, R). The game decomposes trust into two motives: hope that the trustee will reciprocate and lack of fear of betrayal. The trust game conflates these two motives, and the influence of hope is likely larger than that of fear.
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