US router ban is 'industrial policy' not better infosec
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US router ban is 'industrial policy' not better infosec
"The digital economy is global. A router 'Made in the USA' likely runs a Linux kernel maintained by global contributors, uses Wi-Fi drivers written in Taiwan, and incorporates open-source libraries managed by developers worldwide."
"By focusing on the geographic location of the assembly line, the FCC ignores the logical supply chain of the software. A U.S.-assembled router with a poorly written UPnP implementation is just as vulnerable to a hijacking as a foreign one."
"Perhaps the most obvious lack of logic in the FCC's policy is its exclusive focus on new equipment authorizations while leaving legacy devices in place."
The U.S. ban on foreign-made SOHO routers is criticized for not enhancing security and being more about industrial policy. Milton Mueller argues that the FCC's justification relies on flawed reasoning. The digital economy is global, and U.S.-made routers can still be vulnerable due to their reliance on international software components. The FCC's focus on new equipment ignores the risks posed by legacy devices, which are often targeted by attackers. The policy fails to address the real vulnerabilities present in both foreign and domestic routers.
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