The Supreme Court Should Clarify in Lynk Labs How to Apply Loper Bright
Briefly

The Supreme Court Should Clarify in Lynk Labs How to Apply Loper Bright
"For the past five years, I have taught Legislation & Regulation at Oklahoma City University School of Law-a course at the crossroads of administrative law, statutory interpretation, and the legislative process. Each semester, my students and I return to a central inquiry: when, if ever, should courts defer to agency interpretations, and when must judges exercise their own independent judgment? That question has taken on new urgency in the wake of the Supreme Court's recent restructuring of administrative law."
"When the Supreme Court issued Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo last year-explicitly rejecting the Chevron doctrine and directing courts to interpret statutes independently-it marked a transformational moment in administrative law. But nearly a year later, the Court has provided almost no guidance on how Loper Bright should operate in practice. That silence leaves lower courts, practitioners, and legal educators without real examples to illuminate what judicial interpretation should look like in a post- Chevron world."
Loper Bright explicitly rejected the Chevron doctrine and directed courts to interpret statutes independently. The Supreme Court provided little guidance about applying that directive, leaving uncertainty for lower courts and practitioners. The Federal Circuit relied on USPTO policy-driven interpretations in Lynk Labs concerning the meaning of "printed publication" under 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). That reliance aligned judicial reasoning with agency policy rather than established judicial precedent. The alignment risks allowing agency convenience to reshape statutory meanings unless courts assert independent interpretive authority. An amicus brief urged Supreme Court review to clarify and enforce judicial responsibility to interpret statutes.
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