CAFC Clarifies Statutory Versus Constitutional Standing Jurispridence
Briefly

CAFC Clarifies Statutory Versus Constitutional Standing Jurispridence
"The CAFC acknowledged that its standing jurisprudence has 'not always been clear, thereby creating a challenge for district courts applying our precedent.' The court issued a precedential opinion clarifying its case law on statutory versus constitutional standing analyses. The decision reversed and remanded a district court ruling that had dismissed a plaintiff's patent infringement suit for lack of constitutional standing."
"Ergon had previously licensed some rights under the patents to exclusive licensee Ingevity, but retained other rights, including the right to shared control of infringement suits in the case of third-party infringement. The license agreement also limits Ingevity's ability to sublicense the patent rights, requiring review and approval by Ergon first, among other limitations."
"The District Court for the District of Delaware granted the motion, finding that Ergon's 'reserved usage rights and ability to review sub-licensing terms under the Agreement...were not exclusionary rights...[and that its] royalty rights did not confer constitutional standing.' Relying on the CAFC's precedent in Morrow v. Microsoft Corp. and Deere v. Kinze Manufacturing, the district court determined that Ergon's right to sue was not an exclusionary right sufficient to confer Article III standing."
The Federal Circuit issued a precedential opinion clarifying case law on statutory versus constitutional standing analyses. The court reversed and remanded a district court dismissal of a patent infringement suit for lack of constitutional standing. A patent owner and its affiliate sued for infringement of six asphalt-related patents. The patent owner had licensed some rights to an exclusive licensee while retaining other rights, including shared control of infringement suits involving third parties and approval rights over sublicensing. The district court held the retained rights were not exclusionary rights and that royalty rights did not confer constitutional standing. The Federal Circuit found the district court’s approach inconsistent with its standing jurisprudence and reinstated the case for further proceedings.
[
|
]