Maybe the United States Can Be One of Mark Carney's "Middle Powers"

"But now, since the U.S. has decided to dispense with even the veneer of equality, and instead has committed itself to the principle that, as Stephen Miller, one of Trump's top advisers, put it recently, we inhabit a world that "is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power," countries like Canada no longer get to make that bargain. They are told what to do, and tough if they don't like it."

"Instead, nations will need to engage in "risk management," strengthening themselves against attack and building new, more provisional, alliances. Carney, for instance, signed new trade pacts in recent weeks not just with South American nations but also with China, allowing limited imports of E.V.s in return for reduced tariffs on canola oil. On such things will the world now turn, but, if countries decide to go it alone, they will eventually lose."

"And what made his vision something more than Thucydidean realism was his reminder that these "middle powers" by and large still represent the core of values that America is now abandoning, and that they can build their unions at least in part on those shared ideas. Canada, he pointed out, "is a pluralistic society that works. Our public square is loud, diverse, and free. Canadians remain committed to sustainability.""

The United States has abandoned the pretense of equal partnerships and embraced governance by strength, forcing middle-power countries into subordinate positions. Middle powers can no longer rely on economic integration for mutual benefit and must pursue risk management, strengthen defenses, and form provisional, coordinated alliances. New bilateral and regional trade agreements with diverse partners can mitigate vulnerability through reciprocal concessions. Collective action among middle powers builds leverage and preserves shared democratic, pluralistic, and sustainability commitments. Unilateral approaches risk marginalization; combined strategic cooperation offers a viable third path amid escalating great-power rivalry.

Read at The New Yorker