"Existing defenses of the hybrid regime have centered on ordinary citizens' lack of sophisticated political knowledge and the importance of having particularly able individuals in charge of governing. But since electoral democracy also contains certain built-in mechanisms that, when combined with a functioning party system, are capable of reducing the cognitive burdens of average voters and empowering more competent individuals, such defenses fail to make a compelling case for democratic meritocracy."
"Specifically, they owe us a fully developed account of how those mechanisms of electoral democracy will be weakened by its other inherent features so that the hybrid regime becomes a desirable alternative. This article provides such an account by exploring how a well-designed democratic meritocracy can better avoid pathologies of unconstrained political competition that are not only troublesome in themselves but which also undermine electoral democracy's ability to generate superior political outcomes."
Democratic meritocracy defends replacing or supplementing electoral democracy by addressing limits of ordinary voters' political knowledge and the need for particularly able rulers. Electoral democracy possesses mechanisms, alongside a functioning party system, that can reduce cognitive burdens on average voters and empower competent individuals, challenging the necessity of a hybrid regime. A compelling case for democratic meritocracy must show how electoral mechanisms are weakened by other inherent features. A well-designed democratic meritocracy can better avoid pathologies of unconstrained political competition that harm governance and reduce electoral democracy's capacity to generate superior outcomes.
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