Evil is located in the will's choice of maxims rather than in natural inclinations or external circumstances. Evil acts are imputable because the will selects subjective maxims, making inversion of maxims the source of wrongdoing rather than overpowering incentives. Incentives like self-love can condition compliance with moral law, rendering evil intrinsic to human volition and rooted in freedom of choice. Facing this ineradicable challenge is a duty grounded in rational agency and self-transformation. Habituation yields only external conformity or legal virtue, while moral worth requires a radical revolution of the heart; grace is incoherent as a maxim-based solution.
Kant's account of evil makes three key claims with major consequences for moral agency and responsibility. First, the distinction between good and evil lies in the will (R 6:59). Unlike prior theories that locate evil in natural inclinations or external circumstances, Kant situates evil in the will's choice of maxims. This reveals that earlier theories misidentify both evil's source and its effect on agency, leading to misguided remedies (R 6:59).
Second, since the will selects the subjective maxim of action, evil acts are imputable. Instead of a "combat model" where evil is due to overpowering natural incentives, Kant asserts that evil results from the inversion of maxims, whereby incentives like self-love condition compliance with moral law (R 6:36). This makes evil intrinsic to human volition: an internal, inevitable challenge rooted in the freedom of choice.
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