"To say that 'white horse is not horse,' is that admissible? 'It is admissible.' 'How is that possible?' 'Horse' is what denotes shape, 'white' is what denotes color. What denotes color is not the same as what denotes shape. Therefore I say that 'white horse' is not 'horse.' If you were looking for a horse, both a 'brown' horse or a black horse could be offered to you."
"If you were looking for a white horse, a brown horse or a black horse could not be offered to you. ... It is clear that admissible and inadmissible mutually exclude each other. Therefore, a brown horse and a black horse are the same insofar as they can both correspond to there being a horse, but they cannot correspond to there being a white horse. Indeed it is true that 'white horse' is not (the same as) 'horse.'"
Properties like shape and attributes like color are distinguished, with 'horse' denoting shape and 'white' denoting color. Combining an attribute with a property yields a composite description whose extension differs from the broader property alone. A search for 'horse' can be satisfied by horses of various colors, while a search for 'white horse' cannot be satisfied by non-white horses. The admissible versus inadmissible distinction underpins the argument that 'white horse' is not identical to 'horse.' This reasoning invites formal analysis using set theory, semantics, and metaphysics to clarify category membership and linguistic reference.
Read at Warpweftandway
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