"First, I argued that libertarian free will-that is, the idea that the will can form itself in the mind independently of antecedent causes and conditions-is inconceivable. We can imagine to act differently, but we cannot show that we can. Second, the retreat to a higher-order will, imagined to freely act to create the effective will, merely kicks the can down the alley. Any meta-will begs for a yet higher-order will to be explained, and hence, we end up with an infinite regress of wills."
"My essay led to a couple of reactions, which I will describe and attempt to answer. One reaction is that the existence or non-existence of metaphysical freedom does not matter and that, therefore, a corresponding belief or disbelief does not matter. Therefore, one might just believe in free will or act as if the will were free. It is enough, according to this view, that human behavior will remain, in large part, uncertain and unpredictable."
Libertarian free will—the idea that the will forms itself independently of antecedent causes—is inconceivable because imagining different actions does not demonstrate the capacity to choose otherwise. Positing higher-order or meta-wills produces an infinite regress that fails to ground genuine freedom. Fear of losing free will is a cognitive error; absence of metaphysical freedom can open the door to self-discovery and enjoyment. Folk belief in free will often relies on lack of complete knowledge as a defense. Some respond that metaphysical truth about freedom is irrelevant and that acting as if one is free suffices given behavioral unpredictability.
Read at Psychology Today
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