"The question of whether we are free to act compels us to accept that there are different degrees of determinism and that even freedom and causality might be compatible. That was already announced by Saint Augustine, for whom divine providence did not preclude free will. An incompatible position, in which determinism excludes true freedom, could hardly be reconciled with such indisputable phenomena as spontaneity, repentance, rebellion, or resistance, and the capacity for the future, which only finds their place in freedom."
"On the other hand, free will allows us to explain another undeniable fact, namely, the phenomenon of singularity. We can affirm that there are many types of trees. Some bear fruit, others do not. Some are leafy, others not. Some have deciduous leaves, others are evergreen, but they all grow upwards. Natural determinism is built on the foundations of homogeneity. But in the case of human beings, it is different, since there are as many singularities as there are individuals."
Different degrees of determinism allow freedom and causality to coexist. Divine providence need not preclude free will; incompatibilism would contradict phenomena such as spontaneity, repentance, rebellion, resistance, and the capacity for the future, which require freedom. Free will explains human singularity: unlike natural objects that follow homogeneous laws, human beings exhibit unique individual differences. Many causal determinants produce a felt lack of freedom during action, but that rational sensation is itself constitutive of freedom of will. Moving away from the natural realm makes escape from determinism easier, and Kant locates freedom in the noumenal while determinism governs the phenomenal.
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