"The terrifying incident should force SFMTA to take a hard look at its safety systems, management, and culture. This isn't to defend the operator of the train. But imagine if she had passed out completely or just woke up a second later, when it was too late to stop the train from leaving the rails. If they want to prevent a future catastrophe, city leaders must resist the temptation to just blame the driver and move on."
"At the time, Metrolink was just one of many passenger rail systems in the U.S. didn't have such protections. Meanwhile, most of the commuter railroads and transit systems that I grew up riding, such as the Long Island Railroad and the New York subway, have long had automated backup systems that stop trains from running red signals or speeding. It took the Metrolink disaster for federal regulators to demand that passenger railroads install Positive Train Control nationwide."
A Muni N‑Judah operator fell asleep at the controls, nearly causing a derailment when the train approached a point where leaving the rails became possible. The incident exposes gaps in SFMTA safety systems, management practices, and organizational culture that require systemic review rather than sole blame of the operator. Automated safeguards such as Positive Train Control prevent signal violations and overspeed events, and many older commuter systems already use automated backups. The 2008 Metrolink Chatsworth crash showed lack of PTC can produce catastrophic fatalities and prompted federal mandates to require PTC nationwide. City leaders must prioritize system-level fixes.
Read at Streetsblog
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