"The Government argues first that the doctrine should not apply to emergency statutes. Brief for Federal Parties 35- 36. But this argument is nearly identical to one it already advanced in Nebraska. There, the Government contended that a different emergency statute should be interpreted broadly because its "whole point" was to provide "substantial discretion to . . . respond to unforeseen emergencies." 600 U. S., at 500 (internal quotation marks omitted)."
"And as the Framers understood, emergencies can "afford a ready pretext for usurpation" of congressional power. Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 650 (Jackson, J., concurring). Where Congress has reason to be worried about its powers "slipping through its fingers," id., at 654, we in turn have every reason to expect Congress to use clear language to effectuate unbounded delegations- particularly of its "one great power," Nicol, 173 U. S., at 515."
A 6-3 decision finds that two words in Section 1702(a)(1)(B) of IEEPA—'regulate' and 'importation'—cannot justify an expansive presidential power to impose tariffs on imports from any country, product, rate, or duration. The government's argument that emergency statutes should receive broader interpretive deference was rejected as mirroring an argument previously rejected in Nebraska. The decision invokes Youngstown and warns that emergency powers can persist and provide pretexts for congressional usurpation. The ruling demands clear congressional language to authorize sweeping delegations and stresses limits on executive emergency authority for major economic actions.
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