"Once viable, Shor's algorithm could be used to forge classical encryption signatures and break classical encryption public keys of the certificate logs. Ultimately, an attacker could forge signed certificate timestamps used to prove to a browser or operating system that a certificate has been registered when it hasn't."
"To rule out this possibility, Google is adding cryptographic material from quantum-resistant algorithms such as ML-DSA. This addition would allow forgeries only if an attacker were to break both classical and post-quantum encryption. The new regime is part of what Google is calling the quantum-resistant root store."
"The MTCs use Merkle Trees to provide quantum-resistant assurances that a certificate has been published without having to add most of the lengthy keys and hashes. Using other techniques to reduce the data sizes, the MTCs will be roughly the same 64-byte length they are now."
Certificate transparency logs, implemented after the 2011 DigiNotar breach, allow website owners to detect unauthorized certificates. However, quantum computers running Shor's algorithm could forge signatures and break encryption keys protecting these logs. Google addresses this threat by adding quantum-resistant algorithms like ML-DSA to certificate transparency infrastructure, requiring attackers to break both classical and post-quantum encryption simultaneously. The system uses Merkle Trees to maintain quantum-resistant assurances while keeping certificate timestamps at their current 64-byte length. Chrome has already implemented this quantum-resistant root store, with Cloudflare testing approximately 1,000 certificates. The Internet Engineering Task Force is coordinating long-term standardization efforts.
#quantum-cryptography #certificate-transparency #post-quantum-encryption #tls-security #pki-infrastructure
Read at Ars Technica
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