China's attempts to censor Quick UDP Internet Connections (QUIC) are imperfect, posing risks to its censorship infrastructure. Censorship against QUIC began in April 2024, with indiscriminate blocking of certain domains. Researchers indicate that QUIC censorship mechanisms are co-located with existing Great Firewall infrastructure, suggesting operational overlaps. The QUIC blocklist is approximately 60 percent the size of the DNS blocklist, with many blocked domains lacking QUIC support. This inefficiency raises concerns about the potential for enhanced circumvention of censorship efforts.
The researchers found that devices responsible for QUIC censorship are co-located with existing GFW devices, suggesting shared infrastructure and similar management.
China's Great Firewall began indiscriminate blocking of QUIC connections to certain domains in April 2024, highlighting weaknesses in its censorship capabilities.
The QUIC blocklist used by the GFW is roughly 60 percent the size of the DNS blocklist, with many domains on it not even supporting QUIC.
QUIC is adopted by at least 10 percent of websites, including major services from Meta and Google, making it crucial for effective censorship.
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