"Putin, confident in his strategic calculus that the West would provide only token assistance to Ukraine, which would quickly fold under the weight and violence of Russian military might, fatefully launched his attack days later with disastrous consequences for Russia. The country he leads is now even poorer, more isolated, brittle, and dependent (on China) than before. Putin grossly underestimated Ukrainian will, overestimated the competence of his own military and intelligence apparatus, and misjudged Western cohesion."
"Most pundits, even those in the West, have tended to agree with him, much as they did in 2022 about the likelihood that Russia would quickly roll over Ukraine. This mindset, however--that time is on Russia's side--risks a strategic misreading no less profound than his original blunder, because there is a strong argument to be made that Putin's attrition strategy is eroding key foundations of Russian power faster and more deeply than it is eroding the Ukrainian front lines."
Putin launched an invasion expecting a quick victory because he believed the West would provide only token assistance and Ukraine would collapse under Russian military force. The invasion produced disastrous consequences for Russia, leaving the country poorer, more isolated, brittle, and increasingly dependent on China. Putin underestimated Ukrainian resolve, overestimated Russian military and intelligence competence, and misread Western cohesion. After failing to achieve a rapid victory, he adopted a "wait and win" attrition strategy relying on mass, perseverance, and Western impatience. That strategy appears to be eroding Russia's foundations faster than it is degrading Ukrainian front lines. Russia has sustained high war spending but shows growing fiscal strain, with troop numbers maintained largely by financial incentives that are now faltering due to regional budget shortfalls.
Read at The Cipher Brief
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