"It turns out adding an extra, one-time 32-workload unit effort during what would normally be a down day does not pose much risk. If Yamamoto did that once during a regular season, and then kept his normal routine, he would not have spiked his ACWR above our redline of 20%."
"Perhaps a takeaway from Yamamoto's World Series performance is that managers can push their best arms when necessary. They don't always have to be so conservative. Pitchers can be built for such a moment. They can be prepared by being over prepared and see benefits like improved quality of stuff."
"Managers should perhaps be more willing to allow pitchers to take on even greater workload in the postseason and when chasing history in the regular season. The data says it's reasonable safe, and that would be the far more entertaining option."
Analysis of Yoshinobu Yamamoto's decision to pitch Game 7 of the World Series on zero days rest reveals the move was not inherently dangerous. Yamamoto's workload increase of 32 units during a normally scheduled rest day did not exceed safe thresholds, keeping his acute chronic workload ratio below the 20% redline. To pose genuine risk, he would have needed to throw over 100 pitches on back-to-back days. This suggests managers can safely push elite pitchers during critical moments when they have been properly conditioned. The data supports allowing pitchers greater postseason workloads, potentially enabling more entertaining outcomes while maintaining player safety.
Read at Dodgers Digest
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