"Mobile development in 2025 was different. It shifted from a "front-end" concern to a massive, distributed headache in which the most vulnerable component could be any unmanaged, hostile endpoint. In fact, 43% of organizational breaches originate at the mobile edge."
"In web-first development, the server is the ultimate "fortress." Because we control the hardware and software environment, security is focused on sanitizing inputs and hardening the perimeter. Traditional web-centric SAST tools are designed for this model. They scan for logical flaws in the server binary, assuming the binary itself remains protected within the fortress."
"A mobile app is a "messenger in enemy territory." The device and the end-user cannot be trusted, as the app binary is physically in the attacker's hands. Unlike web servers, mobile clients are often responsible for more complex local functions, creating a much larger surface. An attacker can tamper with the binary through repackaging or use tools like Frida to perform dynamic instrumentation."
Mobile development security differs fundamentally from web security due to different trust assumptions. Mobile platforms represent 43% of organizational breaches, yet most DevSecOps pipelines rely on outdated web-centric security models. Mobile apps operate as messengers in hostile territory where devices and end-users cannot be trusted, unlike web servers protected within controlled environments. Traditional SAST tools designed for web applications assume binaries remain protected, but mobile binaries are physically accessible to attackers who can repackage or instrument them using tools like Frida. Mobile apps handle complex local functions creating larger attack surfaces. Modern DevSecOps engineers must address three critical blind spots: man-at-the-end attacks, inadequate binary protection assumptions, and failure to account for the distributed nature of mobile endpoints.
Read at InfoWorld
Unable to calculate read time
Collection
[
|
...
]