"The German army of Conrad III had split up and been largely destroyed by the Seljuk Turks in October 1147, at the Second Battle of Dorylaeum. The French forces, led by King Louis VII, one of the West's most prominent crusaders, were in imminent danger of following them along the same self-destructive trajectory. At the most basic level, they did not even know how to organise their march properly - and the Turks were not the opponents to let such sloppy behaviour go unpunished."
"These were skilled fighting men, but they were walking from Europe to the Holy Land, and encountering Turkic tactics for the first time-their experience counted for very little. In theory at least, they understood broadly what they would be facing. But the armies of the Second Crusade provide a case study in how not to conduct an orderly fighting march in face of the enemy."
Two of Europe's largest crusader armies marched toward the Holy Land and met unfamiliar Turkic tactics that negated much of their combat experience. The German army of Conrad III split and was largely destroyed by the Seljuk Turks at Dorylaeum in October 1147. The French under King Louis VII risked repeating that disaster due to poor march organization: inadequate flank guards for the baggage train, weak control, and lax discipline. Numerous high-ranking nobles pursued independent agendas. Templar veterans attempted to teach best practices such as vanguard and rear guards, but practical application remained insufficient to prevent catastrophic losses.
Read at Medievalists.net
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