"The idea is that BTQ would replace Bitcoin's current signature scheme with ML-DSA, the module-lattice signature standard formalized by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) as Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 204, for post-quantum security assumptions. It is worth remembering that in most Bitcoin quantum-threat models, the key precondition is public-key exposure. If a public key is already visible onchain, a sufficiently capable future quantum computer could, in theory, attempt to recover the corresponding private key offline."
"Most Bitcoin quantum-risk discussions focus on digital signatures, not on Bitcoin's coin supply or the idea that a quantum computer could magically guess random wallets. The specific concern is that a cryptographically relevant quantum computer (CRQC) could run Shor's algorithm to solve the discrete logarithm problem efficiently enough to derive a private key from a known public key, undermining both the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) and Schnorr-based signing."
BTQ Technologies launched a Bitcoin Quantum testnet on Jan. 12, 2026 to trial post-quantum signatures in a Bitcoin-like network separate from mainnet governance. BTQ plans to replace Bitcoin's current signature scheme with ML-DSA, the module-lattice standard formalized by NIST as FIPS 204, to provide post-quantum security assumptions. Post-quantum signature schemes increase transaction sizes and block-space demands significantly. Bitcoin's dominant quantum threat model depends on public-key exposure: if a public key is visible onchain, a cryptographically relevant quantum computer could use Shor's algorithm to derive the private key, threatening ECDSA and Schnorr signatures. Legacy output types and address reuse concentrate old-BTC risk.
Read at Cointelegraph
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